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THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF DEFAMATORY
MEANING
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ABSTRACT. This paper assesses normative arguments regarding four views about
defamatory meaning. The moralised view holds that a statement about a person is
defamatory if and only if we ought to think less of that person if the statement is
true. The nonmoralised view holds that a statement is defamatory if and only if
people in fact think less of the subject on hearing the statement. A third - the dual
view - can be split into two versions. The first version holds that a statement is
defamatory if and only if it satisfies either the moralised or non-moralised views.
The second version holds that statements satisfying either view can be defamatory,
but they ought to be considered fundamentally different forms of personal
defamation, with different remedies, defences and conditions of liability attached.
Both the moralised and non-moralised views are rejected because they fail to
acknowledge instrumental and intrinsic reputational value respectively. The first
version of the dual view is rejected because it compromises the expressive value of
defamation, implausibly suggests that truth should be a general defence and fails to
recognise that different objections apply to the moralised and nonmoralised views.
The upshot is that we ought to accept the second version of the dual view.
KEYWORDS: Reputational value, Scanlon, Tort theory, Defamation
I. INTRODUCTION
Tort theory has a largely monogamous relationship with the study of
negligence. This is understandable since the rise of negligence has
dominated the story of contemporary tort law.1 Perhaps because of
this marriage, tort theorists have not investigated other elements of
the subject in as much detail. As some writers have commented, one
1 See, for example Tony Weir, ‘The Staggering March of Negligence’ in Peter Cane and Jane
Stapleton (eds.) The Law of Obligations: Essays in Celebration of John Fleming (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998), 97–138.
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area receiving comparatively little attention is defamation.2 Though
discussions of freedom of speech abound, questions more specific to
defamation law have been underexplored. More recently, however,
there have been attempts to investigate the underlying values of
defamation.3
Following in this vein, I aim to consider how defamatory
meaning should be defined. But I do not pose this as an interpretive,
conceptual or historical question. I am not seeking to distil a test for
defamatory meaning from the available legal sources, to formulate a
test based on linguistic analysis of a folk concept of reputation, or to
map the historical development of defamatory meaning. Instead, it is
posed as a normative question. Since the definition identifies
potentially actionable reputational harms and is a necessary condi-
tion of liability, it must be informed by the values and interests that
defamation law seeks to protect.4 To settle the matter by appeal to
legal usage or linguistic intuition would be to elide the questions that
any definition must address if it claims to protect something morally
or socially valuable. Thus, the argument will not attempt an analysis
of the common law approach to defamatory meaning, in all its
complexity, but will rather identify and evaluate a series of theo-
retical arguments for and against the available views. I aim to
evaluate four such views, which I will call The Moralised View (MV),
The Non-Moralised View (NMV), The Dual View Version 1 (DV1) and The
Dual View Version 2 (DV2).5 Although all four views have something
to recommend them, I will conclude that the DV2 is the most
defensible view.
2 See Eric Barendt, ‘What is the Point of Libel Law?’ Current Legal Problems 52(1) (1999) 110–125, 112
and Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation, (OUP, 2007), 20.
3 See, e.g. Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation; Dario Milo, Defamation and Freedom of
Speech (Oxford: OUP, 2008); David Howarth ‘Libel: Its Purpose and Reform’ Modern Law Review 74(6)
(2011) 845–877; and Andrew Kenyon ‘What Conversation? Free Speech and Defamation Law’ Modern
Law Review 73(5) (2010) 697–720. For an older but seminal work on the value of reputation, see Robert
Post ‘The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution’ California Law
Review 74 (1986) 691.
4 This is not the only methodological approach, but is rather a presupposition of this paper. Arthur
Ripstein rejects the idea that defamation law protects pre-juridical interests or values, arguing that any
interpretive approach seeking to explain defamation law in terms of the protection of an extra-legal
interest faces serious difficulties. See Arthur Ripstein, Private Wrongs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2016), 193. My aims are primarily normative rather than interpretive and I do not
subscribe to Ripstein’s methodological claims. However, providing a full explication and justification of
the methodology I favour is a task for a later date.
5 Roger S. Magnusson’s distinction between the ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ models roughly coincides with
my distinction between the MV and the NMV. See ‘Freedom of Speech in Australian Defamation Law:
Ridicule, Satire and other Challenges’ Torts Law Journal 9 (2001).
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The MV states that:
A statement, S, about a person, P, is defamatory if and only if one
ought to think less of P if S is true.
On this view, if a statement made by Jennifer leads Melanie to
believe that David is racist, David’s reputation is damaged because
Melanie ought to think less of David if he is racist. The view is open-
ended in a number of ways. I do not specify what it means to ‘think
less of P’, although obvious examples would include the belief that P
has inferior moral or political status; that she has acted wrongfully or
holds immoral attitudes; or that she is selfish, dishonest or cruel.
A second question is this: to which opinions do we refer when
applying the MV? The MV as stated is incomplete: the criteria and
procedure for moral judgment remain to be specified. Should it fall to
judges to decide what morality entails in these situations? Should
judges defer to public opinion? Or should there be a set of pre-designed
principles? These are important questions, but I will not fully address
them here, although I will return to legitimacy issues later. The topics I
discuss can be raised regardless of what assumptions we make about
how we ought to think of others (and in any case I hope that the
assumptions I make on this point are uncontroversial). Although this
formulation of the MV is therefore broad, it is importantly different
from competing views in a few respects. It makes explicit that when
this test is applied a judgement is made about what individuals ought to
think on hearing certain statements. This also entails that the decision
is not dependant, in any fundamental way, on actual or likely reactions.
Despite this, actual reactions can have two subsidiary functions. First,
they may play an evidentiary role in indicating how people ought to
react to the statement, and second, they will help to determine the
level of harm caused and thus the appropriate remedy.
The NMV states that:
A statement, S, about a person, P, is defamatory if and only if people
in fact think less of P on hearing S.
On this view, if Melanie thinks less of David for being racist then he
is defamed. But he is defamed because Melanie in fact thinks less of
him, not because she ought to. So conversely, if Jennifer leads
Melanie to believe that David is not racist, and Melanie thinks less of
him for being a naïve, bleeding-heart liberal, then David’s reputation
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might also be damaged. The court need not make any normative
judgement in applying this view, but rather reach a conclusion about
actual or likely responses to the statement. Again, I will leave open-
ended what it means to think less of P and will rely on
uncontroversial cases that involve ostracism or open hostility.
The DV1 states that:
A statement, S, about a person, P, is defamatory if and only if either
one ought to think less of P if S is true or people in fact think less of P
on hearing it.
This view requires little initial explanation, since it is a combination
of the first two views, except for two clarifications. First, the
disjunctive term is inclusive, so a statement fulfilling both limbs of
the test satisfies the view. Second, strictly speaking the court need
not decide which limb of the test is satisfied. This seemingly minor
detail has significant implications to which I will return later.
The fourth approach to defamatory meaning, the DV2, holds that:
Statements satisfying both the MV and the NMV are defamatory but
a strict symbolic and substantive distinction should be drawn be-
tween them.
Though I will elaborate further on this view later, it effectively
means that statements meeting the moralised and non-moralised
definitions should be considered fundamentally different forms of
personal defamation and should have different remedies, defences
and conditions of liability attached to them. The DV2, therefore, is
not merely a view about what words defame but a view about the
nature of such defamations: the values that they violate and thus the
ways they should be treated, at least presumptively, by courts.
There are two last preliminaries. I will remain silent on the relation
between reputational damage and harm. I will speak of reputational
damage without committing to the idea that such damage constitutes
harm. Whether it is harm in a strict sense depends on which theory of
harm we adopt. On a preference-based theory, according to which a
person is harmed if her preferences are frustrated, a defamatory state-
ment can be harmful only if the victim’s preferences are affected. Alter-
natively, on an objective theory, such statements may be harmful even if
the victim is indifferent to them. It is not clearwhat turns on the question
of whether reputational damage is harm on the best metaphysical ac-
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count of harm. It is natural to think that compensation aims to respond to
harm, but perhaps not exclusively. It may be that ostracism or lost career
opportunities are harmful, and are the proper subject of compensatory
damages,whilst imputationofwrongful conduct is not, and shouldbe the
subject of some other remedy (such as vindicatory damages). Alterna-
tively, perhaps compensation is a proper response to a wider variety of
claims than those arising from harms. Either way, fully exploring the
relationship between reputational damage and harm should not be
necessary to adjudicate between the four views I have stated.
Finally, on themeaning of reputation, I take a person’s reputation to
be the beliefs and attitudes that others hold about her. Although this
distinguishes one’s reputation from one’s self-conception, it is other-
wise broadly conceived. This definition is more neutral than others
proposed in the literature. LawrenceMcNamara takes reputation to be
‘a social judgement… based upon facts which are considered relevant
by a community’.6 This definition conceptually links reputation to a
moral community thus tilting it in favour of his version of the MV.
McNamara does not deny that other definitions are possible and aims
to defend his proposal through normative arguments, but I prefer to
adhere to a more neutral conceptual framework so that adjudicating
between different views is settled directly by their normative appeal
rather than conceptual claims about the nature of reputation.
II. THE MORALISED AND NON-MORALISED VIEWS
TheMV has been defended by several scholars. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky
argues that the courts’ role in screening out undesirable value judg-
ments about reputation is both inescapable and beneficial.7 Similarly,
McNamara states that, ‘A determination of defamatory capacity re-
quires the courts to constitute a jurisdiction as a moral community’.8
And Leslie Treiger-Bar-Am asserts that defamation law should be ‘an
instrument for promoting moral virtue. Hence, the standard for
defamatory meaning… ought to be interpreted so as to promote a
reasoned, principled morality rather than reflect societal prejudices’.9
6 McNamara, Reputation and Defamation 21.
7 See L. B. Lidsky, ‘Defamation, Reputation, and the Myth of Community’ Washington Law Review
71(1) (1996).
8 See McNamara, Reputation and Defamation 192.
9 See Leslie Kim Treiger-Bar-Am, ‘Defamation Law in a Changing Society: The Case of Youssoupoff v
Metro-Goldwyn Mayer’ Legal Studies 20 (2000) 291–319, 319.
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Treiger-Bar-Am’s argument has an instrumentalist flavour: defama-
tion law should be used to promote virtues and discourage vices. By
contrast, I suggest that the primary motivation for the MV is that it
captures the sense in which a person’s reputation can be seriously
affected independently of any consequential harms. In other words, it
captures the non-instrumental value of reputation.
A. Non-instrumental and Instrumental Reputational Value
The non-instrumental value of reputation is the value of the mere fact
that others have particular attitudes or beliefs towards one. Its
instrumental value, on the other hand, is the usefulness of those
attitudes and beliefs in securing further goods.10 For example, the
belief that David is trustworthy may bring him career or business
opportunities; expressions of respect or admiration; opportunities to
enter new relationships; and the conditions necessary to maintain
close social and familial ties. Reversal of this belief might destroy his
career or business opportunities; cause him to be ostracised from his
community; prompt expressions of disapproval or spite; and erode
his close social or familial ties. These consequences set back the
instrumental value of David’s reputation.
Defamatory statements typically diminish both instrumental and
non-instrumental reputational value, but we can imagine cases in
which only the former is affected. Consider the following:
Pub: David goes to his local pub to watch a football game. After
many drinks, he strikes up a conversation with another fan, Melanie,
which drifts into politics. Only later, as he pieces together his
memory of the conversation, does David realise that Melanie formed
the mistaken belief that he is a member of a far right organisation
and harbours racist beliefs about minorities.
In Pub, David’s reputation is seriously compromised even if
Melanie’s beliefs and attitudes about him have no adverse
consequences. Melanie believes that David holds attitudes that are
10 Some take non-instrumental value and intrinsic value to be interchangeable. Others hold that a thing
has intrinsic value by virtue of its internal properties, rather than its extrinsic properties, i.e. its relation to
other things. In contrast, a thing has extrinsic value by virtue of its relation to other things with intrinsic
value. Thus, the distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic value and instrumental and non-instrumental
value are orthogonal. In the present case, I use the terminology of non-instrumental value since this best
captures the relevant phenomenon. For further discussion of intrinsic and extrinsic value, see Rønnow-
Rawmussen T. and Zimmerman M. J. (eds.) Recent Work on Intrinsic Value (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).
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deeply in conflict with his convictions and values, and those he
ought to hold.11 The mere fact that Melanie possesses these beliefs is
sufficient to damage his reputation.
What explains the reaction, for those who share it, that David’s
reputation is damaged in Pub? I suggest we can find an explanation by
developing Thomas Scanlon’s theory of blame. Scanlon argues that ‘to
claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is to claim that the action
shows something about the agent’s attitudes towards others that impairs
the relations that others can havewith himor her’.12 I am sceptical about
Scanlon’s ideas as an account of blame,13 but blame frequently does have
the effect of impairing moral relationships in the way Scanlon describes,
and it is easy to see how statements imputing immorality might do the
same.Whenwe come to believe that someone has actedwrongfully, for
example, we might reconsider the basis of our relationship with her,
cease to value spending time together or raise a complaint.14
We must be careful here to separate those modifications of our
moral relationships that affect the instrumental value of a reputation
and those that affect its non-instrumental value. Some of these
reactions, such as the possibility of raising a complaint, affect the
former as well. If a complaint is raised against us, this might have
other adverse effects on our relationships with people, such as
spending less enjoyable time together. But one of Scanlon’s insights
is that our relationships are not just constituted by the quality of our
experiences or the goods that those relationships make possible.
They are also constituted by the reasons we take ourselves as having
to treat and to view others in certain ways, and those reasons can be
affected merely by belief in another’s wrongdoing. What if a person
commits a wrong against another and neither the victim nor anyone
11 There is another view that I do not have space to consider in this paper, which we can call The
Self-Conception View. This holds that a statement, S, about a person, P, is defamatory if and only if it
lowers P’s estimation according to P’s sincere self-conception. This view is non-moralised, in the sense
that it defers to the claimant’s judgments rather than imposing independent principles, but it can also
recognise the non-instrumental value of reputation, although the explanation for that value must be
different to the one I offer here.
12 See T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2008), 128.
13 For criticisms of Scanlon’s ideas as an account of blame, see R. J. Wallace ‘Dispassionate
Opprobrium: On Blame and the Reactive Sentiments’, in Wallace, Kumar, and Freeman (eds.), Reasons
and Recognition: Essays on the Philosophy of T. M. Scanlon (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) 348–
372, 349 and Susan Wolf, ‘Blame, Italian Style’ in the same volume, 332–347. See also George Sher
‘Wrongdoing and Relationships: The Problem of the Stranger’ in D. J. Coates and N. A. Tognazzini
(eds.) Blame: Its Nature and Norms, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
14 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions 129–130.
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else detects it? Although I do not rule out the possibility that the
wrongdoer and the victim’s relationship is compromised, the
wrongdoer’s reputation is not damaged unless a third party forms
some belief about the wrongdoing. This means that interference
with a moral relationship is a broader category than reputational
damage. My claim is rather that the former explains one facet –
setback to non-instrumental value – of the latter.
Scanlon suggests that what matters are the reasons we take ourselves
as having to treat others in certain ways.15 This implies that there is no
reputational harm in cases where others do not acknowledge reasons
to think less of us. Consider the following variation on Pub:
Pub 2: The same as Pub, except Melanie is a member of a far right
organisation and approves of David on the basis of her mistaken
belief that he is a fellow member. She disseminates this belief to
other members of the organisation.
Does the fact that this belief is held only by organisation members
who approve of David based on this mistaken assumption vitiate the
sense that his reputation is compromised? I do not think so. We
would sympathise with David’s desire to correct the mistake, even if
it had only been spread amongst members who perversely approve.
At this point, some might claim that any value interfered with
here is purely instrumental. What is damaging, it might be sug-
gested, is that David experiences unpleasant emotions – such as
embarrassment and shame – when he contemplates Melanie’s beliefs
about him. Even if these emotions depend primarily on the content
of the belief rather than the evaluative attitude of the believer, it is
the unpleasantness of the emotional response that is bad for him. But
this claim seems mistaken. It is intuitive that David’s reputation is
damaged even if he does not experience any negative emotions. He
may recognise that it is bad for him that others have false beliefs
about his moral character even if he does not experience any emo-
tional discomfort. Moreover, David’s embarrassment may be coun-
terbalanced by other instrumental benefits. Perhaps Melanie sends
him an annual hamper, motivated by her appreciation for their
supposedly shared values. This benefit might render the instrumental
value of Melanie’s belief positive overall, but this does not mask a
15 Ibid., pp. 128–129.
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setback to non-instrumental value. Finally, the claim that the damage
to David’s reputation consists only in the negative emotions he
experiences mischaracterises David’s reactions in Pub and Pub 2.
When David contemplates Melanie’s belief about him, the affective
content of his reaction merely points towards what David is con-
cerned about. The fact that David ought not to be racist, and that
others ought to think less of him if he is racist, is explanatorily prior
to David’s experiencing the sensation of embarrassment.
This example casts doubt on Scanlon’s suggestions that it is the
reasonswe thinkwe have that affect ourmoral relationships. Although
he agrees that it can be wrong to withhold blame when blame is called
for (and thus wrong even though the withholder does not take herself
as having any reason to blame), he explains this by appeal to the
relationship between the party whowithholds blame and the victim of
the wrong for which the blame would be appropriate: we owe it to
victims to blame wrongdoers and failure to do this can impair our
moral relations with them. This suggests that the moral relationship
between the personwhowronglywithholds blame and thewrongdoer
is left untouched. A better explanation is that our moral relationships
with others are constituted, not only by the reasons we take ourselves
as having to treat them in certainways, but also by the reasonswe ought
to take ourselves as having. If I wrongly praise a wrongdoer, my
relationship with her is impaired because I ought to blame her for her
actions. As in Pub 2, my positive reaction reflects a reason, which I fail
to recognise, for me to think less of her. It should not be surprising that
our relationships can be affected by facts such as this, about which we
may bemistaken. For example, a person’s relationship with her spouse
is impaired if she is blithely unaware that he has betrayed her; the
relevant notion of relationship is broader than a purely experiential
one.16 She may mistakenly praise him for his loyalty, but though her
erroneous belief might yield instrumental benefits for them, the fact
that she has a reason to denounce him undermines the foundation of
trust on which (some of) the value of their relationship depends.
16 For discussion of these issues in relation to wellbeing, see Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons,
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 493–502 and Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, (Harvard: Belknap
Press, 1998) 113–126.
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More accurately, we should distinguish between belief-relative,
evidence-relative and fact-relative reasons.17 And we should note
that any of these reasons can be ones that an agent does not
recognise, even though she ought to. So in Pub 2, Melanie has belief
and evidence-relative reasons to condemn David (given her beliefs
about his racist attitudes and the evidence available to her, she ought
to condemn him), but she does not have a fact-relative reason (given
the fact that David is not racist, she ought not to condemn him).
These can be distinguished from the reason she takes herself as
having to praise David for his racist attitudes, which is a reason she
ought not to recognise.
That Melanie has these belief and evidence-relative reasons even
though she mistakenly believes she does not is a controversial claim
that I cannot fully defend here,18 but one of its virtues is that it
explains what goes wrong in cases where blame is absent. In Pub 2,
although Melanie does not blame or exhibit any other negative
reactive attitudes19 towards David, she has belief- and evidence-rel-
ative reasons to do so, and this is sufficient to impair their moral
relationship. Just as justified negative reactions can impair our moral
relations with others, so too can unjustified positive reactions.
Scanlon also argues that we have a relationship, in a general sense,
with everyonewho can understand and respond to reasons.20 According
to him, it is possible to alter our reasons to view others in certain ways
even if we’ve never met them and in this sense our relationship with
them can be impaired. This is not to deny that personal relationships
have greater significance to the people involved than the ‘moral rela-
tionship’ we have with all other reason-following beings, but it explains
both whywe still care about our reputation amongst strangers and why
we generally care more about personal relationships.
Two objections might be raised at this point. First, it might be
argued that personal relationships are those with a minimal experi-
ential dimension, consisting of a sustained pattern of interaction.
Non-estranged friends and family meet this definition, as do many
colleagues and casual acquaintances. But on this definition, we have
17 See Derek Parfit, On What Matters (Oxford: OUP, 2011) Vol. 1, 150–162. See also Victor Tadros,
The Ends of Harm: The Moral Foundations of Criminal Law (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 219–220.
18 For a defence of ‘object-given’ reasons, see Parfit, On What Matters Vol. 1 part 1.
19 On reactive attitudes, see P. F. Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’ Proceedings of the British
Academy 48 (1962), 1–25.
20 Scanlon, Moral Dimensions 139.
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no personal relationships with other reason-following beings, so in
what sense do we have any relationship at all? It is misleading to call
our connection to strangers a relationship since its value cannot be
analysed in terms of any of the typical features of personal rela-
tionships, particularly those that depend on positive interactions
between members such as affection or mutual support, and it is
difficult to see what normative reasons we have to care about our
reputation amongst those with whom we have no relationship. The
absence of meaningful relationships with strangers cannot be pa-
pered over by metaphorical terms such as the ‘moral relationship’,
unless we have a clear account of what this relationship consists in,
which Scanlon does not provide. The second objection, closely re-
lated to the first, is that the concept of the moral relationship does no
independent work in the argument. If the main reason that we value
our reputation amongst strangers is that this will prevent us entering
relationships with them in future, then the explanatory work is done
by personal relationships and the concept of the moral relationship is
redundant.
Rather than attempt to plug the gap in Scanlon’s theory of blame by
providing an account of the moral relationship, I will take a different
approach. I reject the notion of themoral relationship, but argue that a
key feature of personal relationships identified by Scanlon – the reasons
we have to view others positively or negatively – also obtains between
strangers. By arguing in this way, the troublesome apparatus of moral
relationships becomes entirely dispensable. To rely on this claim, it is
important to clarify which features of Scanlon’s account of blame I
must adopt for present purposes. We can identify two distinct claims
implied by Scanlon’s account:
(1) Statements can alter our reasons to view others in certain ways even if
we have never met them.
(2) Altering our reasons to view others in certain ways can impair our
relationship with them, even if we have never met them.
The most important claim for our purposes is (1). Scanlon is right, I
argue, at least that personal relationships are partly constituted by
our reasons to view or treat people in certain ways, rather than
merely their experiential or affective dimensions. However, the kind
of value on which my argument rests is a form of non-instrumental
value attached to beliefs and attitudes that others hold towards us,
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which need not be limited to such relationships. This form of
disvalue, although it is an important constitutive feature of personal
relationships, can exist both inside and outside of them. In other
words, it can obtain between strangers who have no relationship
with each other. Therefore, contrary to Scanlon’s view, we need
only rely on (1).
In Pub, the intuitive worry regarding David’s reputation stems
from the reasons that Melanie and others have to think differently of
him. If we alter the facts of Pub so that David and Melanie do not
meet, it is doubtful that David’s legitimate concerns would evaporate
merely because the false beliefs no longer impair a personal rela-
tionship. Equally, this does not mean that reference to Scanlon’s
view is redundant, since it helps us to see that our relation to
strangers shares some features of personal relationships that we have
reason to care about. The fact that they are important constitutive
features of personal relationships explains why we ought to care
about the same value elsewhere.
It is worth noting that, if this response is not convincing, the
objections limit rather than refute the argument. Even if the non-
instrumental value in question is limited to personal relationships, it
explains how some statements can damage those relationships. This
does not leave our overall account of defamatory meaning implau-
sibly limited, since it is still possible for statements made to strangers
to damage the instrumental value of reputation, which is an issue to
which I will return.
One damages the non-instrumental value of a person’s reputation,
then, if one undermines the reasons others have for viewing that
person in a morally favourable light.21 But although its acknowl-
edgment of this value counts in favour of the MV, its exclusive focus
on it means that it has implausible implications in a range of cases.
Consider the following:
Victim Blaming: As a result of a statement made by David, Melanie’s
community believe that she has been the victim of a rape. The
community has a culture of victim-blaming and Melanie is os-
tracised.
21 The phrase ‘morally favourable’ is deliberately ambiguous between adhering to the demands of
morality and supererogatory conduct. I leave it open whether undermining others’ reasons for thinking
that a person goes above and beyond the call of duty can damages that person’s reputation.
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Homophobia: As a result of a statement made by David, Melanie’s
community believe that she is homosexual. Owing to a culture of
homophobia, Melanie is ostracised.
Heresy: As a result of a statement made by David, Melanie’s com-
munity believe that she is an atheist. The community has a culture of
intolerance for contrary beliefs and Melanie is ostracised.
Informant: As a result of a statement made by David, Melanie’s
community believe that she has informed the police about an act of
domestic violence. The community despises police informants and
Melanie is ostracised.
In each of these cases, Melanie is not defamed on the MV because we
ought not to think less of her, even if the statements have
devastating effects on the instrumental value of her reputation. One
might even point out that, in Informant, the non-instrumental value
of Melanie’s reputation is possibly enhanced as we ought to respect
her courage. But it is difficult to believe that the harm she suffers
cannot be actionable in tort. This seems to ignore the very real
instrumental value of Melanie’s reputation.
One argument in favour of this conclusion is that a person’s
reputation is useful in securing goods that are themselves uncon-
troversially valuable. For example, the belief that someone is trust-
worthy may be necessary to secure an income and meaningful
employment, or to maintain social and familial relationships, and few
would deny that these are valuable. Cases such as the four cited
above, in which only the instrumental value of reputation is affected,
are slightly more difficult. It might be argued that the value of these
social ties depends on basic conditions of trust and respect that are
absent in these intolerant communities. These social ties lack value
because they are sensitive to bigotry: a social group that ostracises its
members for prejudicial reasons is not a social group worth
belonging too.
We must be careful not to throw the baby out with the bathwater
here. These examples are fit for purpose as long that the social
relationships therein have some value, even if the value of these
relationships is substantially mitigated by the prejudicial attitudes of
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the community members. It would be difficult to maintain that
relationships that may possess many other positive dimensions are
rendered valueless for this reason alone. The NMV thus has the
advantage of grounding reputation in actual social attitudes – with all
their flaws – rather than notional ones. Further support for this
approach can be found in Thomas Gibbons’ observation that repu-
tation is not always dependent on moral evaluations, and a person’s
social standing is ‘as likely to be assessed according to the audience’s
preferences and tastes’.22
It must also be remembered that the issue is whether Melanie
suffers a setback to the value of her reputation in the above cases.
More generally, our aim is to determine whether others’ beliefs and
attitudes towards us have a form of instrumental value that partially
explains why our reputations matter. This can be distinguished from
the question of whether, in any individual case, a person should be
liable in tort for causing this reputation damage. Although I claim
that Melanie suffers reputational damage in these cases, it does not
follow from this that David should be liable to compensate her for it.
Nevertheless, identifying and distinguishing the relevant forms of
reputational value is a necessary step towards a theory of liability in
defamation, since a clearer understanding of reputational value will
help us to determine which liability standards are most appropriate. I
return to this issue in Section III.C.
A further objection is that, if popular attitudes are to blame for
the harm Melanie suffers in these cases, the problem should be
addressed through social and political change. If Melanie loses
employment opportunities, the solution is to introduce more robust
anti-discrimination laws rather than pursue an action in defamation.
Compensation is not only an individualistic solution, but fails to
prevent reputational harms by addressing their underlying causes.
This is a crucial point, but not a damaging one, since I do not
advocate the NMV as an alternative to root-and-branch social reform,
but rather a supplement to it. It may also be impossible to eradicate
such prejudices entirely, or it may be achievable only after a pro-
tracted struggle, so these cases may be unavoidable even if we accept
that a right of action in defamation is not an optimal solution.
Moreover, although the NMV is a test for defamatory meaning and
22 Thomas Gibbons, ‘Defamation Reconsidered’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 16(4) (1996) 587, 592.
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does not impute wrongdoing to the defendant, the mediation of
reputational harm through the wrongful attitudes of others does not
preclude wrongdoing on behalf of the defendant either. It is an open
question, for example, whether those who negligently make state-
ments that satisfy the NMV ought to compensate victims. This
position is arguable even if others are also responsible for the harm.
Finally, it might be suggested that the NMV impedes rather than
supplements social reform by giving credence to prejudicial views.
This concern may be due to the failure to distinguish between the
MV and the NMV. The distinction between these views captures the
idea that damaging statements can be of two fundamentally different
types: those that, if true, ought to lower a person’s estimation and
those that do lower a person’s estimation. Once this distinction is
properly clarified, statements satisfying the NMV should not be
perceived as giving any credence to the attitudes of those who think
less of the claimant. In fact, as we will see in the next section,
recognising the expressive value of defamation law supports the DV2.
Our conclusion, then, is that a person’s reputation can have
instrumental value. However, the problem with the NMV is the
corollary of the objection to the MV, namely that it fails to consider
the non-instrumental value of reputation. It is hard to believe that
imputations of seriously wrongful conduct can be rendered non-
actionable simply because the victim’s associates, or the wider
community, perversely approve of them. As Pub shows, David can
legitimately claim that his reputation is damaged if others come to
believe that he is racist, even if they are more positively disposed to
him as a result. To dismiss this setback to the victim’s reputation
would stifle her attempt to vindicate her character and conduct. If,
for example, a published retraction of such a statement would dis-
abuse people of these beliefs, it would be wrong to deny the victim
this remedy because she has benefitted from this change in her
reputation. The NMV, like the MV, assumes an inaccurate and
fragmented picture of the value of reputation.
For similar reasons, it should be clear that a definition requiring
that a statement satisfy both the MV and NMV is also untenable. Such
statements will represent the best claims in defamation and may
attract bigger remedies, but the conceptual structure of defamation
should not rule out claims that only satisfy one of the tests. Such a
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view would be vulnerable to the same criticism levelled at the tests
individually: they assume a fragmented picture of the value of the
reputation by failing to accept that impairment of the non-instru-
mental (or instrumental) value of reputation is significant on its own.
III. EVALUATING THE DUAL VIEWS
The arguments considered so far suggest that statements made by
others can set back both the non-instrumental and instrumental
value of a person’s reputation. The advantage of the DV1 over both
the MV and the NMV is that it has plausible implications in a wider
range of cases. It implies that both imputations of immoral conduct
that have no consequential harms and consequential harms that do
not follow from imputations of immoral conduct can be defamatory.
Unfortunately, this advantage raises its own problems.
A. Expressive Value
On the DV1, both the moralised and non-moralised elements are
internal to the definition of defamation. However, the expressive
value of a judgement that a statement has satisfied either the mor-
alised or non-moralised element of the definition should be sharply
distinguished. (Here, following Anthony Duff, I refer to the
expressive value of judgements rather than communicative value.
This distinguishes legal pronouncements from the interactive com-
municative process of, say, a criminal trial).23 Although judgements
on defamatory meaning lack the condemnatory force of criminal
punishment, they do embody a form of what Joel Feinberg calls
‘symbolic non-acquiescence’.24 On the MV, by finding that a person
ought to think less of another on hearing some statement pertaining
to her, the judgement gives content to a legal conception of the
attitudes and beliefs of the moral person; it conveys a message about
which statements ought and ought not to lead us to think less of
others. Putting the point another way, McNamara claims that the
refusal to recognise a judgement of a person as defamatory ‘has an
exclusionary function with respect to the constitution of the juris-
23 See Anthony Duff, Punishment, Communication, Community (Oxford: OUP, 2003).
24 See Joel Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton University
Press, 1970), 102–103.
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diction as a moral community’ because it rejects the values that
underpin that judgement.25
This reveals a powerful objection to the DV1, namely that it
compromises the expressive value of judgments about defamatory
meaning. Consider the contrast between a statement that a person
has committed a rape and a statement that a person is the victim of a
rape. On the DV1, both might be defamatory: the former satisfies the
moralised element and the latter, in certain circumstances, satisfies
the non-moralised element. But unless an explicit decision is made
about which element of the definition is satisfied – and on the DV1
this decision need not be made if it is clear that at least one element
is satisfied – the expressive value of the judgement is ambiguous.
This is a serious problem given the radical difference in the
expressive content of the respective judgements. If an imputation of
victimhood is seen to satisfy the moralised element, the law endorses
victim-blaming, and if an imputation of rape is seen to satisfy only
the non-moralised element, the law fails to express the appropriate
condemnation for a serious wrong.
The problem is especially worrying if definitions of defamation fail
explicitly to distinguish the two elements. But even where judgements
attempt explicitly to distinguish between moralised and non-moralised
elements, troubling ambiguity can still creep into a decision. InYoussopoff
v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd,26 although the judges denied that a
film suggesting that Princess Natasha of Russia had been raped imputed
moral discredit, theymay have implicitly applied a subtler version of the
MVbasedon themoral valueof female chastity, particularlywith respect
to members of the royal family. Leslie Treiger-Bar-Am argues, in her
analysis of the case, that a rape victim is ‘tainted with sexual impurity,
and hence, as purity entails moral worth or value, with immorality’,27
demonstrated in part by the judges’ slippage between the terms ‘raped’
and ‘ravished’. The DV1 may seem like a practical compromise, but in
forging this compromise it creates an ambiguous space in which courts
can rely on suppressed moral judgments.
25 McNamara, Reputation and Defamation 125.
26 (1934) 50 TLR 581.
27 Treiger-Bar-Am, ‘Defamation Law in a Changing Society: The Case of Youssoupoff v Metro-Gold-
wyn Mayer’.
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B. The Truth Defence
There is another equally significant problem: it is not clear whether
the defence of ‘truth’ ought to be available.28 A successful application
of the truth defence denies the unlawfulness of the injury to the
claimant.29 A plausible basis for the defence might be stated as fol-
lows: if A has committed some wrong, she is morally liable30 to
suffer the appropriate consequences, such as legal censure and a
lower estimation in the minds of others, and therefore lacks a right
to be compensated for them.31 But if this is the basis of the truth
defence, or even part of its basis, it should only be available with
regard to statements that satisfy the moralised definition, for only in
this instance has A done anything that could make her liable for
damage resulting from public knowledge of her actions. If truth can
be a defence to an action based on a statement that satisfies only the
NMV, this has unacceptable implications in many cases involving
damage purely to the instrumental value of reputation. For example,
in Victim Blaming, the applicability of the truth defence has the dis-
astrous implication that Melanie is morally liable to suffer ostracism
because she is a victim of rape; in Homophobia, it implies that Melanie
is morally liable to suffer ostracism because she is homosexual, and
so on. These implications obviously provide a further reason not to
combine both views within a unified test for defamatory meaning.
It may be pointed out that truth is no defence to breach of privacy
rights and legal regimes that protect such rights provide sufficient
protection. McNamara argues that the imputations just described
should be actionable as invasions of privacy but have no place in
defamation law. This follows from his claim that a statement about a
person that imputes no moral discredit cannot harm her reputation,
since reputation is exclusively concerned with the moral judgements
28 I will not consider whether truth should be an absolute or partial defence, but there is a strong
argument for the latter interpretation. See R. R. Ray, ‘Truth: A Defense to Libel’ Minn. L. Rev. 16 (1931)
43.
29 See Eric Descheemaeker, ‘Mapping Defamation Defences’ The Modern Law Review 78(4) (2015)
641–671, 650–652.
30 Here I use the concept of moral liability rather than legal liability. On one view, to say that a
person who has committed a wrong is morally liable to suffer damage to her reputation is to say,
roughly, that she is not wronged by others thinking less of her. For more detailed discussion of this
concept of moral liability, see Victor Tadros, ‘Orwell’s Battle with Brittain: Vicarious Liability for Unjust
Aggression’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 42(1) (2014) 42, 47–51.
31 For discussion of the possible bases of the truth defence, see Ray, ‘Truth: A Defense to Libel’.
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of a community, and statements lacking any moral implications
about their subjects are irrelevant for these judgements.32
There are several problems with this reply, however. First, it rules
out the possibility that reputation can have only instrumental value.
As I have been arguing, this seems wrong: the beliefs that others
hold about us can be useful in securing a range of goods and
opportunities, even if these beliefs are morally irrelevant or abhor-
rent, and this is most plausibly categorised as a form of reputational
value. Although what is of primary importance is that valid claims
are recognised and invalid claims rejected, the legal categorisation of
claims is still of secondary importance since separate (though over-
lapping) sets of values underpin reputation and privacy, and claims in
these respective domains of law have different justificatory bases.33
Violations of privacy, for instance, might be grounded in the value of
autonomous control of personal information rather than material
damage.34 Since the purpose of defamation law is primarily to
remedy wrongful damage to reputation, it would be odd if these
cases were dealt with by privacy law rather than defamation.
Secondly, legal protection of privacy may not apply to all relevant
cases. On any legal regime for the protection of privacy there might be
victims who have suffered reputational harm and who cannot justify
an action for invasion of privacy who will be left without a remedy.
This may be because the information is entirely false, in which case it is
questionable whether this constitutes an invasion of privacy,35 or be-
cause the information is not sufficiently personal to fall within the
protected sphere of privacy, even though it causes reputational harm.
C. Opting for the Dual View Version 2
The arguments regarding expressive value and the truth defence
already suggest that a symbolic and substantive distinction should be
drawn between claims based on the moralised and non-moralised
32 Lawrence McNamara, Reputation and Defamation 189.
33 See John Gardner, ‘Torts and Other Wrongs’ Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 39 (2012) 43.
34 See C. Fried, An Anatomy of Values (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970) and W. Parent,
‘Privacy, Morality and the Law’ Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12 (1983) 269–288.
35 Although note the US category of invasion of privacy consisting in publicity that unreasonably
places the claimant in a ‘false light’. However, it seems more arbitrary to include false information
causing damage to the instrumental value of others’ attitudes towards one under privacy law than
defamation.
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views. A further reason is that the different types of claim are vul-
nerable to different objections. Depending on the strength of these
objections, it may be mistaken to apply identical conditions of lia-
bility. Of course, what is offered here falls short of a complete
argument that statements satisfying the moralised and non-moralised
views should be considered fundamentally different forms of
defamation, but it may be enough to raise concerns about the ten-
dency to combine the two very different tests in a unified analysis of
defamatory meaning.
1. Liberal Legitimacy
The MV faces a problem of legitimacy, which can be derived from
the liberal critique of the use of state power to promote values that
citizens can reasonably reject. This important strand of anti-perfec-
tionist liberal thought suggests that vesting the authority to deter-
mine how we ought to react to a given statement with judges and
lawmakers, whose decisions will affect the legally enforceable duties
imposed by defamation law, raises a problem of legitimacy.36 The
claimant or defendant, who is subject to the coercive authority of the
civil court, may be able reasonably to reject an opinion about
whether a statement imputes immorality. With what justification
does the court coerce an individual based on a controversial judg-
ment that the individual rejects?
The view that liberal ideas of political justice in pluralistic soci-
eties should be brought to bear on the study of private law has
recently gained some support. Writing from a Rawlsian perspective,
Samuel Scheffler has rejected the idea that private law is excluded
from the basic structure of society.37 McNamara argues that the
assessment of defamatory capacity should be based on a Rawlsian
overlapping consensus. On his view, ‘a vast range of imputations
would be actionable under a liberal framework for the presumptive
content of ‘‘the right-thinking person’’’,38 because an imputation
36 The foundational discussion of liberal legitimacy is John Rawls’, Political Liberalism,(New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993). Those who have extended the constraint from the basic structure of
society to the exercise of all coercive authority include Charles Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 86 and Jonathan Quong, Liberalism without Perfection (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 233–250.
37 See Samuel Scheffler, ‘Distributive Justice, the Basic Structure and the Place of Private Law’ in
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 35(2) (2015), 213–235.
38 McNamara, Reputation and Defamation 213.
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ought to be actionable if a subsection of society with a reasonable,
comprehensive religious, philosophical or moral doctrine would
consider it relevant for moral judgement. Courts should therefore
refer to a hypothetical person who represents a member of an
inclusive liberal community, committed to ‘equal moral worth,
freedom of moral choice, protection from harm and moral diver-
sity’.39
This seems to misapply Rawls’ thesis in Political Liberalism,
however, which defends a constraint against the exercise of certain
forms of political power40 without reasons that can be accepted by
any reasonable, comprehensive doctrine. McNamara loses sight of
the fact that the civil court’s authority is exercised over both the
claimant and defendant, and imputations that are defamatory on the
claimant’s comprehensive view might be reasonably rejected by the
defendant, thus raising again the problem of legitimacy. What the
liberal view recommends, therefore, is not a more expansive ap-
proach to defamatory capacity in which any reasonable belief can be
invoked, but a more restrictive one in which only those statements
that would damage a person’s reputation on all reasonable com-
prehensive conceptions are admissible. It is only statements satisfy-
ing the latter test that can in principle be justified from the
perspective of both the claimant’s and the defendant’s comprehen-
sive doctrines.
This liberal challenge does not destroy the MV, but if correct it
does restrict its scope. One way to temper the objection is to appeal
to a threshold of moral seriousness that any defamatory statement
should meet in order to be actionable. Imputations of minor
improprieties are too trivial to merit a legal claim. Even more serious
allegations such as abusive language may not, in many contexts,
sufficiently damage a person’s reputation. Graver imputations of
immoral conduct, however, such as conduct that seriously violates
the rights of others, are likely to meet the relevant threshold even if
the statements have no further negative effects. But, crucially, as
imputations of immoral conduct become more serious, reasonable
39 Ibid.
40 Rawls restricted the requirement to provide public reasons to the constitutional essentials of
society and issues of basic justice, but other liberal thinkers have extended the requirement to any
exercise of coercive power. See Rawls, Political Liberalism, 91; Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 159; and Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 137.
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disagreement about whether the conduct in question is genuinely
immoral correspondingly decreases. The most serious imputations
undermine a person’s standing as a free and equal citizen, which
might justify legal recourse, at least within a liberal framework.
Another possibility is that the court should defer to the com-
prehensive doctrine of the party who had a substantially better
opportunity to avoid the outcome. An example will help to illustrate
the point. Suppose that Melanie makes a statement implying that
David is a Scientologist. David reasonably believes that this state-
ment damages his reputation whilst Melanie does not. If Melanie
made the statement maliciously to ruin David’s reputation, then the
statement ought to be actionable on the MV because Melanie could
easily have avoided making the statement by not forming the
malicious intention. Conversely, if Melanie conveyed the implication
accidentally and non-negligently, it would be unfair to allow David
to bring an action against her when she can reasonably reject David’s
conviction that his reputation is damaged.
I lack space here to investigate further the impact of liberal
concerns on the legitimacy of defamation judgements. My point at
this stage is that, depending on how the objection is resolved, it is
prudent to leave open the possibility that claims based on the MV of
defamatory capacity must meet different substantive requirements.
2. The Wrongs of Others
Let us now turn to an objection that applies to the NMV. If a victim
can claim against a publisher of a statement, and the statement
satisfies only the NMV, then the defendant might be held responsible
for the wrongful attitudes of others. The publisher of the statement
may not endorse the prejudicial attitudes of those who think less of
the claimant, and this raises two questions: first, whether causation
for the damage should be attributed to the defendant, and secondly,
whether she should owe a corrective duty to the victim when the
harm for which the victim complains is primarily the responsibility
of others. Allowing such claims in defamation appears to conflict
with other areas of tort law such as negligence, in which defendants
are rarely liable for property damage or physical injury inflicted by
third parties.
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Two points are worth making about this apparent inconsistency.
The first is that third parties who intentionally inflict injury or
property damage are likely to be civilly and criminally responsible.
Those who hold wrongful attitudes, however, generally enjoy the
protection of rights to freedom of speech, conscience and associa-
tion, even if their attitudes cause great harm.41 Moreover, harm to
the victim is often caused by these attitudes as a collective, and
consequently no single individual will have primary responsibility.
Victims do not have the same legal recourse to hold those with
morally wrongful attitudes to account, which is one reason to afford
them extra protection from defamatory statements.
Might this objection justify the introduction of a requirement for
carelessness, if not actual malice, for statements satisfying the NMV?
As before, it is not my purpose to answer this question here. The
point is that, based on the discussion thus far, attaching different
thresholds of liability to the moralised and non-moralised views is an
open possibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
The upshot of this discussion is that we should adopt the DV2.
Because it endorses a sharper symbolic divide between different
kinds of statements, it is less likely to compromise the expressive
content of defamatory judgements. It also forces the court to label its
normative judgements more clearly, making them more amenable
to scrutiny. We have also explored reasons why claims in respect of
the moralised and non-moralised views might be substantively dif-
ferent. My interest in this paper is in the theoretical foundations of
the law, but our discussion also has practical implications for the
legal framework on defamatory meaning. I will conclude by briefly
noting two of them.
First, the distinction between non-instrumental and instrumental
reputational value has implications for any requirement regarding
the harm inflicted by a defamatory statement. The upshot of the
present argument is that such requirements should not be purely
instrumental. If an imputation is morally serious, such as an accu-
41 These rights are not absolute, of course. Even the right to choose one’s company ought to be
limited in certain ways. See Kimberly Brownlee, ‘Freedom of Association: It’s Not What You think’
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 35(2) (2015) 267–282.
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sation of a violent offence, it would be inappropriate to require a
claimant to prove any other kind of damage, as this would fail to
protect the non-instrumental value of reputation. Arguments in fa-
vour of a general requirement for claimants to prove actual harm fail
to appreciate this value, or to consider the possibility of limiting the
scope of the requirement rather than imposing it uniformly.42
Equally, if the claim is in respect of instrumental harm to reputation,
proof of other damage – such as financial loss, hostility or ostracism
– should be required, and proof that people in fact think that the
imputation is morally serious is irrelevant. For example, if someone
is accused of assisting the police in a domestic violence enquiry, it is
irrelevant that a section of the community thinks that ‘grassing’ is
morally objectionable, but if the victim is ostracised by the com-
munity, proof of this fact alone may justify an action for damages.
Moreover, the distinction between non-instrumental and instru-
mental value maps onto a familiar distinction in tort between wrongs
that are actionable per se –without proof of damage – and those that are
actionable only when the claimant shows that she has suffered a
recognised form of harm. One reason in favour of actionability per se is
to prevent the burden of proof falling on the claimant. But thewrong of
damaging the non-instrumental value of one’s reputation offers an-
other explanation why libel is actionable per se.
Second, distinguishing between different forms of reputational
value helps to properly itemise reputational harm. A person who is
ostracised because he is accused of serious wrongdoing is harmed
more than a person who is ostracised for unjustified reasons, even if
the material harm is identical. This may in turn affect the appropriate
selection of remedies. Vindicatory damages might be appropriate for
the immaterial damage, perhaps combined with compensatory
damages to reflect any harm to instrumental value. Although the
availability of vindicatory damages is controversial and the argu-
ments against them must be addressed, their appropriateness for this
purpose can be added to the case in their favour.
42 See, e.g. David Anderson, ‘Reputation, Compensation and Proof’ William and Mary Law Review 25
(1984) 747, 749–751.
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